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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Debra Harrow, administratrix of her husband Stanley 
Harrow's estate, appeals an order granting summary 
judgment to Prudential Insurance Company on her claim 
that Stanley Harrow and a putative class of plaintiffs were 
wrongfully denied insurance coverage for Viagra, in 
violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B) and 29 U.S.C. 
S 1104(a). The District Court granted Prudential's motion 
for summary judgment, finding plaintiff failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies before instituting suit. Harrow v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 76 F. Supp. 2d 558 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 
We will affirm. 
 




Stanley Harrow was insured under the Prudential 
HealthCare HMO Plan through his wife, Debra Harrow. In 
1998, Mr. Harrow was prescribed Viagra, an FDA-approved 
drug, for diabetes-related impotence.1  On April 21, 1998, 
Mr. Harrow filled his prescription for Viagra at a local 
pharmacy. During this visit, his pharmacist informed him 
that his insurance did not cover Viagra, charged him 
$85.99 to fill the Viagra prescription, and instructed him to 
call Prudential. Upon returning home, Mr. and Mrs. Harrow 
reviewed the Prudential HealthCare HMO Plan handbook. 
On that same day, Mrs. Harrow called the claims 
department number listed on the back of the Prudential 
prescription card. She was informed by an unidentified 
person that the plan did not cover Viagra because it was a 
"new drug." She was also advised to save her receipts for 
future reimbursement in case Viagra became covered. The 
Harrows never contacted Prudential again about Viagra 
coverage and never refilled the prescription. On May 21, 
1998, a month after being told Viagra was not covered, Mr. 
Harrow filed suit under ERISA. In June or July of 1998, 
Prudential announced in a press release that it would not 
provide coverage for Viagra. 
 
Prudential's procedures for receiving and resolving 
complaints raised by covered persons are set forth in the 
Prudential HealthCare HMO Plan handbook.2  Under the 
heading "Grievance Resolution Procedure," the multi-step 
process is described as follows: 
 
       COMPLAINTS: 
 
       Complaints can be received by the Membership 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Viagra received FDA approval on March 27, 1998. 
 
2. As noted, the Harrows received the Prudential handbook outlining 
these procedures and reviewed the handbook prior to calling the 
telephone number on their Prudential prescription card. But Mr. Harrow 
asserted that he learned of Prudential's internal grievance procedures for 
the first time during deposition questioning by opposing counsel. When 
asked whether he made any follow-up telephone calls or wrote any 
letters after reviewing the plan documents, Mr. Harrow stated only that 
he gave the plan documents to a lawyer. 
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       Services Coordinator in the Prudential HealthCare 
       Member Services Department by phone, mail or a 
       personal visit to the Prudential HealthCare office. The 
       Membership Services Coordinator will provide an 
       answer to the complainant within 30 days of a 
       complaint's receipt. If your problem is not resolved to 
       your satisfaction, you may file, in writing, a formal 
       grievance. 
 
       GRIEVANCES: 
 
       There are two steps in the Grievance Procedure. At any 
       state of this process, the member has the right to 
       request that Prudential HealthCare appoint a member 
       of its staff, who has had no direct involvement with the 
       case, to represent the member. 
 
       STEP ONE: 
 
       If the complaint procedure does not resolve your 
       problem to your satisfaction, you may file, in writing, a 
       formal grievance. The initial grievance will be reviewed 
       and investigated by an Initial Grievance Committee 
       . . . . The Committee will provide a response, in writing, 
       to the complainant within 30 days of receipt of the 
       grievance, including the reasons for the decision and 
       the member's appeal rights. This decision is binding 
       unless the member appeals the decision . . . . 
 
       STEP TWO: 
 
       APPEAL OF GRIEVANCES 
 
       If an appeal is desired, the complainant will be advised 
       to formally request, in writing, the convening of the 
       Second Level of Grievance Review Committee . . . . This 
       committee shall consist of at least one-third Prudential 
       HealthCare Plan members . . . . 
 
       An ultimate appeal procedure is available to the 
       member. If the member is not satisfied with the 
       decision of the Second Level Grievance Review 
       Committee, the decision may be appealed to the 
       Pennsylvania Department of Health. 
 
Several Prudential officials testified the outcome of the 
 
                                4 
  
internal appellate process was not pre-determined. 3 
Harrow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 560. No evidence was presented 
demonstrating that Mr. Harrow or any proposed class 
member initiated a grievance or appeal under Prudential's 




Prudential filed a motion to dismiss, which the District 
Court denied without prejudice on January 25, 1999. In 
the same order, the District Court adjourned, without date, 
plaintiff 's motion for class certification so that discovery 
could be undertaken. The originally named plaintiff, Stanley 
Harrow, died on June 25, 1999 and his wife was 
substituted as the named plaintiff and proposed class 
representative.4 The District Court subsequently granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment on December 
23, 1999. Id. at 559.5 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
defendant on plaintiff 's wrongful denial of benefits claim for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies: "Making one 
step which could be construed as an initial complaint does 
not constitute exhaustion of all remedies, particularly when 
the Plan includes a concrete description of the appeal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. These employees included Dr. Anthony Martin Kotin, Chief Medical 
Officer for Prudential HealthCare group, and Dr. Lisa Head, Chief 
Pharmacy Officer and Vice President of National Program and Business 
Development. 
 
4. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class: 
 
       all persons covered by a Prudential insurance plan or policy under 
       an employee welfare benefit plan who have (i) been diagnosed by a 
       physician as being either organically, structurally, or 
psychologically 
       impotent; (ii) have had Viagra prescribed by a physician for their 
       impotence; and (iii) have been denied insurance coverage for all or 
       a portion of their Viagra prescription. 
 
5. Plaintiff 's motion for class certification was not heard in light of 
the 
grant of summary judgment. The District Court explained that its grant 
of summary judgment on the grounds of lack of exhaustion precluded 
any further action. Id. at 561. We see no merit to plaintiff 's argument 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be waived when 
plaintiff seeks class-wide declaratory relief. 
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process available." Id. at 561-62. The District Court also 
concluded the futility exception to the exhaustion 
requirement did not apply because "neither Mr. Harrow nor 
any identified potential class member ever pursued any 
appellate procedures with Prudential." Id.  at 564. In 
addition, the District Court granted summary judgment on 
plaintiff 's breach of fiduciary duty claim for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, concluding plaintiff was 
actually seeking benefits and therefore was subject to the 
exhaustion doctrine. Id. at 566. 
 




The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 





We exercise plenary review over an appeal from a grant of 
summary judgment, applying the same standards as the 
District Court. Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Anderson, 921 
F.2d 497, 498 (3d Cir. 1990). We review de novo the 
applicability of exhaustion principles, because it is a 
question of law. Cf. Diaz v. United Agric. Employee Welfare 
Ben. Plan & Trust, 50 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980)). 
When the District Court declines to grant an exception to 
the application of exhaustion principles, we review for 
abuse of discretion. Id.; see also Dishman v. Unum Life Ins. 
Co. of Am., Nos. 99-55963, 99-56077, 2001 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22599, at *23 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2001); Gallegos v. 
Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 210 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2000) 
("[T]he intent of Congress is best effectuated by granting 
district courts discretion to require administrative 
exhaustion."); Springer v. Walmart, 908 F.2d 897, 899 (11th 
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he decision whether to apply the exhaustion 
requirement is committed to the district court's sound 
discretion and can be overturned on appeal only if the 
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A. The Legal effect of Stanley Harrow's death on his 
claims 
 
1. Survivability of ERISA claims  
 
Because the original named plaintiff has died in the 
course of these proceedings, we must consider whether his 
ERISA claim survives. Actions that are remedial in nature 
generally survive the death of a party. Khan v. Grotnes 
Metalforming Sys., Inc., 679 F. Supp. 751, 756-57 (N.D. Ill. 
1988). Because Congress intended ERISA to be remedial, 
ERISA actions survive death. See 29 U.S.C.S 1001(b) ("It is 
hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect 
. . . the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans."); see also Duchow v. N.Y. State Teamsters 
Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 691 F.2d 74, 78 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Khan, 679 F. Supp. at 756-57. Therefore, Mrs. 
Harrow may pursue her husband's claims.7  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We recognize that a "denial of benefits challenged under S 
1132(a)(1)(B) 
is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives 
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine 
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone 
Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Pinto v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392-93 (3d Cir. 2000). But 
Firestone and its progeny are not applicable here because we do not 
reach the issue of whether Prudential's decision to deny Viagra coverage 
was proper under the terms of the plan itself. Rather, we consider only 
whether the District Court properly required the plaintiff to exhaust 
administrative remedies before reviewing a denial of benefits. See Wolf v. 
Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(applying exhaustion principles before the arbitrary and capricious 
standard). 
 
7. When an executor or administrator continues with a decedent's claim, 
she "stands in the shoes of the decedent." Kamerman v. Ockap Corp., 
112 F.R.D. 195, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Ransom v. Brennan, 437 
F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1971); Synder v. Baumecker, 708 F. Supp. 1451, 
1458 (D.N.J. 1989). 
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2. Mootness of Harrow's claims 
 
We must also determine whether an Article III case or 
controversy survives Mr. Harrow's death. U.S. Parole 
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395 (1980) (identifying 
two aspects of mootness: "[W]hen the issues presented are 
no longer `live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome.") (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). The mootness issue implicates 
our jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 
U.S. 83, 90 (1998); Chong v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S. , 264 F.3d 378, 
383 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Inasmuch as mootness would divest us 
of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we are obligated to 
address this issue as a threshold matter.") (citing Rogin v. 
Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 684 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 
Mr. Harrow initially asked for injunctive relief, 
declaratory relief, and damages. Mrs. Harrow concedes the 
claim for injunctive relief is now moot because of her 
husband's death. Her claim for declaratory relief is also 
moot because Mr. Harrow cannot benefit from a declaration 
of Prudential's obligations under the plan. Md. Cas. Co. v. 
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) ("Basically, 
the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, 
under all the circumstances, show that there is a 
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse 
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."). But Mrs. 
Harrow still has a claim for damages (i.e., reimbursement of 
the $85.99 spent on the Viagra prescription). Therefore, 
plaintiff 's damage claim is not extinguished by Mr. 
Harrow's death. 
 
B. Summary Judgment was properly granted on 
plaintiff 's benefits claim for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies 
 
An ERISA beneficiary may bring a civil action to"recover 
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce 
his rights under the terms of his plan, or to clarify his 
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan . . . ." 
29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B). "Except in limited circumstances 
. . . a federal court will not entertain an ERISA claim unless 
the plaintiff has exhausted the remedies available under 
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the plan." Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing Wolf, 728 F.2d at 185); Zipf v. Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 799 F.2d 889, 892 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Amato v. 
Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[S]ound policy 
requires the application of the exhaustion doctrine in suits 
under [ERISA]."). Courts require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies "to help reduce the number of 
frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent 
treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a nonadversarial 
method of claims settlement; and to minimize the costs of 
claims settlement for all concerned." Amato , 618 F.2d at 
567. Moreover, trustees of an ERISA plan "are granted 
broad fiduciary rights and responsibilities under ERISA . . . 
and implementation of the exhaustion requirement will 
enhance their ability to expertly and efficiently manage 
their funds by preventing premature judicial intervention in 
their decision-making processes." Id.; see also Zipf, 799 
F.2d at 892 ("When a plan participant claims that he or she 
has unjustly been denied benefits, it is appropriate to 
require participants first to address their complaints to the 
fiduciaries to whom Congress, in Section 503, assigned the 
primary responsibility for evaluating claims for benefits."). 
 
A plaintiff is excused from exhausting administrative 
procedures under ERISA if it would be futile to do so. 
Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("Although the exhaustion requirement is strictly 
enforced, courts have recognized an exception when resort 
to the administrative process would be futile."). Plaintiffs 
merit waiver of the exhaustion requirement when they 
provide a "clear and positive showing of futility." Brown v. 
Cont'l Baking Co., 891 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1995); 
see also Davenport v. Abrams, Inc., 249 F.3d 130, 133 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (exhaustion not excused because correspondence 
with employer did not amount to an "unambiguous 
application for benefits and a formal or informal 
administrative decision denying benefits [such that] it is 
clear that seeking further administrative review would be 
futile") (quotation omitted); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 162 F.3d 410, 419 (6th Cir. 1998) ("A plaintiff must 
show that `it is certain that his claim will be denied on 
appeal, not merely that he doubts that an appeal will result 
in a different decision.' ") (quoting Lindemann v. Mobil Oil 
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Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1996)); Tomczyscyn v. 
Teamsters, Local 115 Health & Welfare Fund, 590 F. Supp. 
211, 216 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (plaintiffs must demonstrate that 
a policy is so fixed that an appeal would serve no purpose); 
cf. Scholl v. Qualmed, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 850, 854 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000) (dismissing Viagra claim brought under the 
Federal Employee Health Benefits Act because futility not 
demonstrated where plaintiff was "unhappy" with coverage 
limitation, but did not "directly appeal"). 
 
Whether to excuse exhaustion on futility grounds rests 
upon weighing several factors, including: (1) whether 
plaintiff diligently pursued administrative relief; (2) whether 
plaintiff acted reasonably in seeking immediate judicial 
review under the circumstances; (3) existence of a fixed 
policy denying benefits; (4) failure of the insurance 
company to comply with its own internal administrative 
procedures; and (5) testimony of plan administrators that 
any administrative appeal was futile. Of course, all factors 
may not weigh equally. See Berger, 911 F.2d at 916-17; 
Metz v. United Counties Bancorp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 364, 383- 
84 (D.N.J. 1999) (relying on Berger). 
 
In Berger, we affirmed a finding of futility where the 
District Court excused three of four plaintiffs seeking 
retirement under a particular pension plan from exhausting 
administrative remedies. 911 F.2d at 917. We agreed the 
blanket denial of applications for a particular retirement 
plan -- and Edgewater's failure to comply with the plan's 
administrative procedures -- weighed in favor of concluding 
that "any resort by these employees to the administrative 
process would have been futile." Id. But we also affirmed 
the denial of the futility exception to a fourth plaintiff who 
had never asked for the specific type of retirement plan, 
holding: "We agree with the district court's conclusion that 
because Kier did not request 70/80 retirement, he is 
precluded from seeking judicial relief on his claims seeking 
to enforce the terms of the Plan." Id. The District Court here 
found Mr. Harrow's case to be more like that of the fourth 
plaintiff for whom the futility exception was not granted. 
The Court also cited to Metz, in which none of the plaintiffs 
had filed an application for enhanced benefits as required 
under the severance plan. See Metz, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 383- 
84. 
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Other courts of appeals have addressed whether the 
futility exception applies in circumstances that more closely 
mirror our case. These cases involve plaintiffs who, like Mr. 
Harrow, have requested plan benefits. Given the policies 
underlying the exhaustion requirement, these courts have 
been reluctant to grant the exception without clear evidence 
of futility. E.g., Bourgeois v. Pension Plan for Employees of 
Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 215 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 91 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(refusing to excuse exhaustion because plaintiff did not 
allege "any factual basis" for his futility claim); Diaz, 50 
F.3d at 1485-86 (denying futility exception where Spanish- 
speaking claimants were delinquent in filing an 
administrative appeal, even though insurance company's 
on-site representative said, "They're not going to pay," 
because court found "record contains nothing but 
speculation to suggest that the administrators would have 
reached a preconceived result in that respect."); see also 
Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods. 117 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D. 
Mass. 2000) (requiring exhaustion where administrator 
arguably evidenced an intent to refuse plaintiff 's claim 
because court refused to "predict" how administrator would 
have decided the claim on review); Kulik v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., No. 96-1608, 1998 WL 404383, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 
25, 1998) (unanswered letter summarizing phone 
conversation with plan administrator does not demonstrate 
futility because the letter contained no request for 
information and no reference to plaintiff 's intent to appeal 
denial of his claims).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Plaintiff relies in part on Sibley-Schreiber v. Oxford Health Plans, 
Inc., 
62 F. Supp. 2d 979, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) for his contention that the 
District Court misapplied the law regarding exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. This case is distinguishable on its facts. In Sibley, the 
District 
Court found "overwhelming evidence" of futility where "numerous 
telephone calls were made to defendants in an effort to get an exception 
to the [insurance plan's] `no pay' and six pill policies. Plaintiff 's 
physician's were required to, and did, submit letters of medical necessity 
. . . [r]egardless of the efforts and opinions of plaintiffs' physicians, 
defendants consistently denied coverage beyond six pills after that policy 
was announced." 62 F. Supp. 2d at 986. The Sibley court recognized 
"Certainly, an allegation of futility is not satisfied by the mere showing 
that a claim was denied when initially presented to the insurance 
company." Id. (citing Comm. Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 
F.3d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
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Here, the District Court summarized the evidence as 
follows: 
 
       The Harrows did not pursue any action beyond this 
       initial [telephonic] inquiry to Prudential . .. . They 
       never refilled the prescription for Viagra . . . . In June 
       1998, Prudential made public statements that it would 
       not cover Viagra. (Cave Dep. At 93). Dr. Lisa Head and 
       Anthony Kotin have been deposed on the issue of 
       Prudential's appeals process. (Defendant's Exhs. C, D). 
       At Dr. Head's deposition, she stated that the fact that 
       Prudential's policy was to deny coverage of Viagra 
       would not mean that all appeals would be 
       automatically denied. 
 
       Q: Under those circumstances, would you expect 
       any appeal to be successful? 
 
       A. I would expect that the appeal would go through 
       the process that we've outlined in previous 
       testimony and that they would be given a fair 
       assessment of the information available by that 
       committee . . . . I would expect that it would go 
       through the process. I don't know that that 
       would be upheld in every circumstance. 
 
       (Head Dep. at 62, 63, Defendant's Exh. C). However, 
       there is evidence from internal e-mails within 
       Prudential that perhaps the policy was more uniform 
       than suggested by Dr.'s Head and Kotin. For example, 
       one e-mail message stated "I'm carboning others just to 
       ensure that we are clear that there is no local authority 
       to approve coverage for Viagra even on a single case 
       exception basis or for a specific claimant." (Gottsch 
       Decl., Exh. I). Finally, there is no evidence that any 
       formal appeal from a denial of Viagra coverage was ever 
       taken by any person who might arguably be a class 
       member. 
 
Harrow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 560. Because the Harrows took 
no steps beyond an initial telephonic inquiry, the District 
Court held that plaintiff did not qualify for the futility 
exception. Id. 
 
We see no abuse of discretion in the District Court's 
refusal to apply the futility exception to the exhaustion 
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doctrine. Mr. Harrow made one telephone call to Prudential 
before instituting an ERISA suit. Mr. and Mrs. Harrow 
reviewed the plan handbook outlining complaint 
procedures, but none were filed. The press release 
announcing Prudential's general policy of denying coverage 
was made at least one month after Mr. Harrow brought 
suit. Mrs. Harrow was told to save her receipts in the event 
Prudential did cover the drug, suggesting that internal 
administrative procedures would not necessarily be futile. 
Furthermore, Prudential administrators testified that the 
outcome of its internal appeal procedures was not 
predetermined, although as the District Court noted, there 
was conflicting testimony in this regard. Viewing the facts 
and weighing the relevant factors, we agree with the District 
Court that a plaintiff in these circumstances was obligated 
to do more than make one telephonic inquiry before 
instituting suit. In this sense, plaintiff did not act 
reasonably. 
 
This case is difficult because at some point in the future 
-- in this instance, only a few months -- Prudential 
adopted a blanket policy denying coverage for Viagra. But 
at the time Mr. Harrow filed suit it was unclear and 
uncertain whether Prudential would automatically bar 
coverage. More importantly, the Harrows took no action 
after the initial phone call to an unidentified person to 
press their request. Under this set of facts, the exhaustion 
of remedies requirement demands more. For these reasons, 
we agree the futility exception does not apply and we will 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment on 
the benefits claim for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. 
 
C. Summary Judgment was properly granted on 
plaintiff 's breach of fiduciary duty claim 
 
The District Court also dismissed the claim alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. Mrs. Harrow contends the 
exhaustion requirement does not apply because she is 
asserting statutory rights under ERISA S 404, 29 U.S.C. 
S 1104(a).9 But the District Court held that the fiduciary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. 29 U.S.C. S 1002(21)(A) states: "a person is a fiduciary with respect 
to 
a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
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duty claim merely recast the benefits claim in statutory 
terms and was still subject to the exhaustion doctrine. We 
agree. 
 
As noted, courts require exhaustion of administrative 
remedies prior to hearing an action for a denial of ERISA 
benefits. We apply the exhaustion requirement to ERISA 
benefit claims, but not to claims arising from violations of 
substantive statutory provisions. Zipf, 799 F.2d at 891 
(administrative exhaustion not required when plaintiff 
alleged termination in violation of ERISA S 510); Savage v. 
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 96-1709, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11106, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1996) ("Where 
statutory violations are alleged, a claimant need not 
exhaust his/her administrative remedies before seeking 
relief in federal court, whereas claims alleging a denial or 
requiring a recalculation of benefits must first be submitted 
on internal appeal to the plan."), aff 'd , 162 F.3d 1151 (3d 
Cir. 1998); Blahuta-Glover v. Cyanamid Long Term Disability 
Plan, No. 95-7069, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5786, at *13 
(E.D. Pa. May 1, 1996).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises 
any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its 
assets . . . ." Section 1104(a) sets forth a"prudent man standard of care" 
for fiduciaries: 
 
       a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan 
solely in 
       the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-- 
 
       (A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
 
       (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
 
       (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; . . . 
 
       (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing 
       the plan 
 
       . . . . 
 
10. The circuits "are in sharp disagreement" as to whether plaintiffs 
must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action in 
federal court to assert a violation of substantive statutory provisions 
like 
ERISA S 510 (unlawful termination) and S 404 (breach of fiduciary duty). 
Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 1999). Compare id. at 365 
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In Zipf, we explained why we do not apply the exhaustion 
doctrine to claims arising under substantive provisions like 
S 510: 
 
       When a plan participant claims that he or she has 
       unjustly been denied benefits, it is appropriate to 
       require participants first to address their complaints to 
       the fiduciaries to whom Congress, in Section 503, 
       assigned the primary responsibility for evaluating 
       claims for benefits . . . However, when the claimant's 
       position is that his or her federal rights guaranteed by 
       ERISA have been violated, these considerations are 
       simply inapposite. Unlike a claim for benefits brought 
       pursuant to a benefits plan, a Section 510 claim 
       asserts a statutory right which plan fiduciaries have no 
       expertise in interpreting. Accordingly, one of the 
       primary justifications for an exhaustion requirement in 
       other contexts, deference to administrative expertise, is 
       simply absent. Indeed, there is a strong interest in 
       judicial resolution of these claims, for the purpose of 
       providing a consistent source of law to help plan 
       fiduciaries and participants predict the legality of 




To date, the cases applying the Zipf exception have 
primarily fallen in two categories: "(1) discrimination claims 
under S 510 of ERISA, or (2) failure to provide plaintiffs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
("[T]he judicially created exhaustion requirement does not apply to a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty as defined in ERISA."); and Horan v. 
Kaiser Steel Retirement Plan, 947 F.2d 1412, 1416 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) 
("The exhaustion requirement applies to plaintiffs' benefits claim, but 
does not apply to the plaintiffs' fiduciary breach claim because this 
claim 
alleges a violation of the statute, ERISA, rather than the Plan."); and 
Held v. Manf. Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 
1990) (not requiring exhaustion for an unlawful termination claim); with 
Perrino v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) 
("We apply this exhaustion requirement to both ERISA claims arising 
from the substantive provisions . . . and ERISA claims arising from an 
employment . . . agreement."); and Lindemann , 79 F.3d at 650 (stating 
District Court has discretion to require exhaustion for ERISA S 510 
claim). 
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with summary plan descriptions, as required by ERISA." 
Harrow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 566 & n.4 (listing cases). But the 
rationale articulated in Zipf is equally applicable to claims 
brought under ERISA SS 404-406, 11 U.S.C.S 1104(a), for 
breach of fiduciary duty because these claims are also 
statutory. See Glenn Smith, 184 F.3d at 364 n.7. 
 
Plaintiffs cannot circumvent the exhaustion requirement 
by artfully pleading benefit claims as breach of fiduciary 
duty claims. Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 846 F.2d 
821, 826 (1st Cir. 1988) (exhaustion doctrine would be 
"rendered meaningless" if plaintiffs were allowed to bypass 
exhaustion by artfully dressing contract claims in statutory 
clothing). When the facts alleged do not present a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim that is independent of a claim for 
benefits, the exhaustion doctrine still applies. See Smith, 
184 F.3d at 363 (independent fiduciary duty claim 
established where plaintiffs alleged that defendants sold 
preferred stock at undervalued prices); Diaz, 50 F.3d at 
1484-85 (discussing applicability of exhaustion where 
plaintiffs alleged that plan's failure to notify them in 
Spanish was a statutory breach). A claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty is "actually a claim for benefits where the 
resolution of the claim rests upon an interpretation and 
application of an ERISA-regulated plan rather than upon 
an interpretation and application of ERISA." Smith, 184 
F.3d at 362.11 
 
Here, plaintiff 's complaint states: 
 
       In failing to insure that plaintiff and members of the 
       class were furnished with coverage under the Plans for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In Smith, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
considered the artful pleading problem in the ERISA context. Upon 
examining Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077 (5th Cir. 1990) and 
Drinkwater the court concluded that plaintiffs were required to exhaust 
administrative remedies before bringing a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty in federal court where the basis of the claim is a plan 
administrator's denial of benefits or an action by the defendant closely 
related to the plaintiff 's claim for benefits, such as the withholding of 
information regarding the status of benefits. 184 F.3d at 362 ("[I]t is 
clear that such a claim is a naked attempt to circumvent the exhaustion 
requirement."). 
 
                                16 
  
       their Viagra prescriptions, defendants have failed to 
       discharge their duties: (a) solely in the interest of the 
       Plan participants and beneficiaries and for the 
       exclusive purpose of providing benefits to the 
       participants and beneficiaries; (b) with the requisite 
       care and skill required of ERISA fiduciaries; and (c) in 
       accordance with the documents and instruments 
       governing the Plan. 
 
Harrow, 76 F. Supp. at 565. 
 
Given this language, the District Court concluded plaintiff 
was recasting a benefits claim in statutory terms as a 
means of bypassing the exhaustion requirement. Id. 
("[A]lthough couched in terms of a statute, plaintiff 's claim 
is based on the Plan itself and the failure of the defendant 
to provide benefits under the Plan."). The District Court 
explained: 
 
       [P]laintiff 's breach of duty claim clearly involves some 
       legal issues, [but] is premised on the fiduciaries' 
       responsibilities under the Plan. This is a topic on 
       which the Plan fiduciaries have expertise. In addition, 
       this Court believes that a claim for breach of a duty to 
       provide benefits should not be brought before giving 
       the Plan fiduciaries an opportunity to provide those 
       benefits. This could only occur through exhaustion of 




We agree that plaintiff is actually challenging a denial of 
benefits, and not conduct amounting to a statutory breach 
of fiduciary duty. Unlike the plaintiffs in Smith, Mrs. 
Harrow does not allege facts that, if proven, establish a 
breach of fiduciary duty independent of the denial of 
benefits (e.g., selling preferred stock at an undervalued 
price). As the District Court observed, the language of the 
complaint itself demonstrates that Mrs. Harrow's claim was 
actually premised on the plan administrators' failure to 
furnish plaintiff with insurance coverage for Viagra. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Harrow attempts to bolster her 
argument that the fiduciary duty claim is "independent" by 
arguing for the first time on appeal that Prudential failed to 
issue a written denial of benefits as required under 29 
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12. Generally, we do not review issues raised for the first time at the 
appellate level, and we do not choose to exercise our discretion to do so 
here. Gardiner v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 646 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
U.S.C. S 1133(1).12 To be sure, "many employee claims for 
plan benefits may implicate statutory requirements 
imposed by ERISA . . . [b]ut that prospect does not give a 
claimant the license to attach a `statutory violation' sticker 
to his or her claim and then to use that label as an 
asserted justification for a total failure to pursue the 
congressionally mandated internal appeal procedures." 
Diaz, 50 F.3d at 1484. The Harrows made only one phone 
call to Prudential before instituting the present suit and 
cannot now excuse their failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies by draping a benefits claim in statutory language. 
 
Having concluded that Mrs. Harrow's claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty constitutes a recasting of a claim for 
benefits, we hold that the District Court properly granted 





For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court will 
be affirmed. 
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